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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, more than three dozen jurisdictions in the
United States passed some form of social enterprise legislation.1 Social
enterprise statutes allow for the formation of for-profit entities that
expressly require directors to consider the interests of corporate
constituents beyond merely shareholders.2 Proponents of these social
enterprise statutes argue that such statutes are needed because traditional
corporate law prevents sacrificing the financial interests of shareholders in
the interest of a broader social good, or in the interest of other stakeholders.
Recently, social enterprises have started exploring public markets and
showing up on the radar of investment professionals, including those
covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
ERISA has long required plan fiduciaries to “discharge [their] duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries,”
but various iterations of guidance from the Department of Labor (DOL)
show differing amounts of favor or disfavor toward Economically
Targeted Investments (ETIs)—investments made for financial returns and
collateral social benefits to participants.3 This Article seeks to uncover and
explain the relationship between social enterprises (most of which are
likely to be classified as ETIs) and ERISA, while also discussing the
current and future place of social investing in the broader financial world.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of impact investing
and the array of newly created social enterprise legal forms. Part II takes
stock of the current state of social enterprise investing. Part III examines
ERISA and the DOL’s guidance on extra-financial considerations when
making investment decisions. Part IV describes the difficult line
proponents of social enterprise forms, such as benefit corporations, must
walk. On one hand, social enterprise proponents argue for the statutory
permission to intentionally sacrifice profits, and, on the other hand, they
argue that social enterprises will provide a market rate of return. The last
1. See
Here’s
the
Latest
L3C
Tally,
INTERSECTOR
PARTNERS,
L3C,
http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally.html [https://perma.cc/M52P-2XPQ] [hereinafter L3C Tally]
(showing nine states and two Native American tribes have passed L3C legislation since 2008); State
by State Status of Legislation, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-statestatus [https://perma.cc/5BMF-REQ4] (noting that thirty states and the District of Columbia have
passed benefit corporation legislation since 2016).
2. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681,
706–07 (2013) (noting the mandate by social enterprise law, such as benefit corporation law, for
directors to consider various stakeholders).
3. See infra Part III.
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substantive section, Part V, unpacks financing options outside of the
ERISA umbrella for social enterprises such as venture capital and
crowdfunding while also considering the future of social enterprise
investing under ERISA. A brief conclusion closes the Article.
I. IMPACT INVESTING AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LEGAL FORMS
Interest in social enterprises, organizations that use commercial
means to reach social ends, is increasing among entrepreneurs, investors,
governments, attorneys, and customers.4 This Part starts with a brief
overview of the various social enterprise legal forms available in the
United States and discusses some of the debates among experts related to
these social enterprise forms.
A. Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies
In 2008, Vermont passed the first social enterprise law in the United
States, allowing for the formation of low-profit limited liability companies
(L3Cs).5 Including Vermont, a total of nine states have passed L3C laws
(though, North Carolina repealed its L3C law effective January 1, 2014,
bringing the total number of active L3C state statutes down to eight).6 The
passage of L3C legislation has stalled in more recent years with Rhode

4. See, e.g., DAVID BORNSTEIN & SUSAN DAVIS, SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1–20 (2010) (describing the history and definitions of social
entrepreneurship); MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN
ENTREPRENEURS 1–15 (2011) (noting the increase in social enterprises and providing a definition of
social enterprise as a business that is mission-driven and seeks to better the lives of others); Tania
Bucic, Jennifer Harris & Denni Arli, Ethical Consumers Among the Millennials: A Cross-National
Study, 110 J. BUS. ETHICS 113, 113–14 (2012) (noting ethical purchasing habits and varying levels of
engagement with cause-related marketing); Andrew White, Lessons from Companies That Put
Purpose Ahead of Short-Term Profits, HARV. BUS. REV., June 9, 2016, https://hbr.org/
2016/06/lessons-from-companies-that-put-purpose-ahead-of-short-term-profits?mod=djemCFO_h
(describing companies that are seeking social purpose); J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law
Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 543–55 (2016) (describing the various social enterprise statutes enacted
by state governments in the United States over the past decade); Sean Greene, Preface to THE CASE
FOUNDATION, A SHORT GUIDE TO IMPACT INVESTING (2014), http://casefoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/ShortGuideToImpactInvesting-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C39V-7T4Z]
(noting the increasing interest in impact investing); Susan Mac Cormac, Impact Investing, MORRISON
FOERSTER, http://www.mofo.com/special-content/impactinvesting [https://perma.cc/2CLX-MTWX]
(listing various impact investing and social enterprise articles from the major law).
5. See J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited
Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in
Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 283 (2010).
6. See Eric H. Franklin, A Rational Approach to Business Entity Choice, 64 U. KAN. L. REV.
573, 591 (2016) (citing the eight states with L3C statutes in place, and noting that a ninth state, North
Carolina, repealed its L3C statute).
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Island passing the latest state L3C statute in 2012.7 The L3C form was
conceived, in large part, to attract Program-Related Investments (PRIs)
from foundations, and the statutory language mimics the IRS’s
requirements for making proper PRIs.8 The IRS, however, failed to create
a clear L3C safe harbor for PRIs and, consequently, interest in the form
has waned.9 Academic criticism of L3Cs started relatively soon after the
first state legislation passed; the criticism focused mainly on the form
being unnecessary and not providing significant advantages in attracting
PRIs.10 Substantively, the L3C statutes remain probably the strictest social
enterprise law on entity purpose, requiring that the L3C “significantly
furthers the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational
purposes” and requiring that the L3C “would not have been formed but for
the company’s relationship to the accomplishment of charitable or
educational purposes.”11 Furthermore, the L3C statutes require that “[n]o
significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the
appreciation of property,” though the statutes explicitly state that making
a profit is not “conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the
production of income or the appreciation of property.”12 Despite such
restrictive statutory language, approximately 1,300 L3Cs have been

7. See L3C Tally, supra note 1 (showing one L3C statute newly effective in 2008, four in 2009
(including the Oglala Sioux Tribe), three in 2010 (including North Carolina, which was later repealed),
one in 2011, one in 2012, and one (the Navajo Tribe) in 2014).
8. See Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic Construct, and Legal
Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 15–17 (2010).
9. See John A. Pearce II & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Regulation of L3Cs for Social
Entrepreneurship: A Prerequisite to Increase Utilization, 92 NEB. L. REV. 259, 261–62 (2013); Jamie
Hopkins, Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies: High-Risk Tax Fad or Legitimate Social
Investment Planning Opportunity?, 2014 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 35, 42–43 (2014),
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/HOPKINS_2014_35.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
QWQ5-WMX9].
10. See generally Carter G. Bishop, The Low Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by
Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243 (2010); Cassady V. (“Cass”) Brewer, Seven Ways to
Strengthen and Improve the L3C, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 329 (2013); J. William Callison & Allan W.
Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially
Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 274–75
(2010); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on the
Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 879 (2010); J. Haskell Murray &
Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and
Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2011);
Cass Brewer, Hybrid Business Entities in 2014, SOCENTLAWBLOG (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://socentlaw.com/2014/01/hybrid-business-entities-in-2014/
[https://perma.cc/V4DR-H64M];
Anne Field, North Carolina Officially Abolishes the L3C, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2014/01/11/north-carolina-officially-abolishes-the-l3c/.
11. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4162 (2010); see also Cassady V. Brewer &
Michael J. Rhim, Using the ‘L3C’ for Program-Related Investments, 21 TAX’N EXEMPTS 11, 11, 13
(2009) (stating that the Vermont L3C statute is similar to the L3C statutes in other states).
12. See sources cited supra note 11.
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formed nationwide; however, the rate of formation appears to be slowing
and research did not uncover any publicly traded L3Cs.13
B. Benefit Corporations, Public Benefit Corporations, and Benefit LLCs
In 2010, two years after the passage of the first L3C statute,
Maryland passed the first benefit corporation statute.14 Including
Maryland, thirty states and the District of Columbia have passed benefit
corporation or public benefit corporation statutes.15 Most states passed
benefit corporation statutes based on the Model Benefit Corporation
Legislation (the Model).16 However, Delaware and Colorado’s public
benefit corporation (PBC) laws significantly depart from the Model in
certain areas.17 Differences between the Model-based laws and the PBC
laws are discussed in detail in another article by this author, but the
primary differences are that, unlike the Model, PBC laws require a specific
social purpose (instead of just a general one) and are more enabling in
some areas than the Model, which tends to use more mandatory
language.18 The Model requires benefit corporations to pursue a “general
public benefit,” defined as “[a] material positive impact on society and the
environment,
taken
as
a
whole,
assessed
against
a
third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit
corporation,” and requires that annual public reporting be measured
against a third-party standard; however, Delaware’s PBC law only
requires reporting be done on a biennial basis, and both public reporting
and the use of a third-party standard are optional.19 As another variation,
Minnesota’s statute allows the formation of general benefit corporations
(similar to a Model-type benefit corporation) and specific benefit
corporations (similar to the social purpose corporations described in Part
13. See Pearce & Hopkins, supra note 9, at 282 (2013) (noting that “L3Cs do not have the
liquidity of publicly traded companies”); L3C Tally, supra note 1.
14. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01 (West 2014) (effective Oct. 1, 2010).
15. State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/
policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/5BMF-REQ4].
16. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. (2016) (The current version of the model legislation is dated
April 4, 2016, but multiple versions of the model exist and some statutes were based on earlier versions
that were slightly different than the current model legislation.).
17. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-101-501 to -509 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2011 & Supp. 2015).
18. See J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation
Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 347–70 (2014) (detailing the major differences between the Model
Benefit Corporation and Delaware PBC. Note that the Delaware PBC statute has been amended since
this 2014 article was written.). The Delaware PBC law is more flexible than the Colorado PBC law,
given that the Colorado PBC law follows the model in its reporting requirements. Compare DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2011 & Supp. 2015), with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-101-501 to -509
(West 2006 & Supp. 2014), and MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. (2016).
19. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 201(a), 401–02 (2016); see Murray, supra note 18.
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I.C below).20 Maryland and Oregon both have benefit corporation laws but
deviate from the norm by having also passed laws allowing formation of
benefit LLCs.21 The statutory language for benefit LLCs largely follows
the benefit corporation language, but the statutory gaps are filled with the
state LLC statute rather than the state corporate statute.22 As of late 2015,
approximately 3,300 benefit entities have been formed and the benefit
entity proponents appear to be the largest group of supporters for the social
enterprise forms.23
Proponents of the benefit corporation form authored a white paper
(the Proponent White Paper) that argues that the entity type is a needed
addition to the legal forms menu.24 The Proponent White Paper claims not
only that the market is demanding a social enterprise legal form like the
benefit corporation but also that “existing legal frameworks do not
accommodate for-profit mission-driven companies” like the benefit
corporation.25 In arguing that existing legal frameworks do not
accommodate social enterprises, the Proponent White Paper focuses on
Dodge v. Ford26 and Delaware cases, like Unocal and Revlon, which took
place in the company sale context.27 The Proponent White Paper
recognizes that “strict reading of Dodge v. Ford and other cases that
specify shareholder wealth maximization as a fiduciary duty has been
criticized by those who believe that these cases do not represent the current
state of modern corporate law.”28 The Proponent White Paper attempts to
argue, however, that “Dodge v. Ford remains good law and many still

20. MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 304A (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); see infra Part I.C.
21. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns §§ 4a-1201 to -1208 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 60.750–60.770 (2014).
22. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns §§ 4a-1201 to -1208 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 60.750–60.770 (2014). See generally J. Haskell Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, U. CIN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017).
23. See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 588 (2016).
24. See generally WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. & LARRY VRANKA, BENEFIT CORP., WHITE PAPER:
THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT
BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE
PUBLIC, (2013), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Benefit%20Corporation%20
White%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM6Y-S4MW] [hereinafter PROPONENT WHITE PAPER].
25. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 2–14.
26. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). In addition to Dodge v. Ford, the
Proponent White Paper also cites Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986);
Long v. Norwood Hills Corp., 380 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Granada Investments, Inc. v.
DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 459 (N.D. Ohio 1993). But see Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop
Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 172–74 (2008) (arguing that Dodge v. Ford is
bad law from both a normative and a positive position).
27. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 7–14.
28. Id. at 7.
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maintain that its ‘theory of shareholder wealth maximization has been
widely accepted by courts over an extended period of time.’”29
The Proponent White Paper argues for benefit corporation statutes
in both constituency and nonconstituency statute states. Regarding
constituency statute states, the Proponent White Paper claims that there is
scant case law interpreting constituency statutes, that constituency statutes
are vague and do not state how much weight to place on different
stakeholders, and that other constituencies do not have standing to sue.30
In nonconstituency statute states, like Delaware, the Proponent White
Paper examines three contexts: (1) day-to-day decisions, (2) takeover
defense decisions, and (3) change of control decisions.31 In the day-to-day
context, the Proponent White Paper argues that even though these are the
kind of decisions protected by the business judgment rule and of the kind
that allow “directors [to] enjoy most discretion,” the law requires that these
“decisions must show some connection to shareholder value.”32 The
Proponent White Paper also notes that some mission-driven companies
will make decisions that “might result in a diminishment of shareholder
value, even over the long term,” and that those types of decisions
knowingly embracing below-market terms may not be allowed under
current law.33 In the takeover defense and company sale situations, the
Proponent White Paper notes the increased focus on shareholders’
29. Id. at 8 (quoting STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 9.2 at
413 (2002)).
30. Id. at 9–10. Interestingly, the benefit corporation statutes suffer from nearly all of those
mentioned flaws: even less case law exists regarding benefit corporation statutes than constituency
statutes; the benefit corporation statutes give little guidance to directors; the statutes do not specify the
weight to be applied to different stakeholders; and while a third-party standard is required, the statutes
provided little information about what the third-party standard should contain or how courts should
use the standard in analyzing director conduct. The benefit corporation statutes do not expressly
provide outside constituencies with standing to sue as a default.
The Proponent White Paper notes
“permissive constituency statutes only create the option (and not the requirement) for directors to
consider interests of constituencies other than shareholders. . . . Mission-driven executives and
investors are often in minority shareholder positions and would prefer that directors and officers be
required to consider these expanded interests when making decisions.” Id. at 10. The Proponent White
Paper does not discuss when or why minority shareholders should be prioritized over majority
shareholders and does not discuss whether a traditional corporation in a constituency statute state could
mandate nonshareholder constituency consideration in the firm’s articles of incorporation.
31. Id. at 11; see also J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise,
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10–17 (2012) (discussing
the different legal standards at play depending on the type of decision facing directors).
32. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12 (emphasis added); see also, Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 109–29 (2004)
(providing justifications for a powerful, abstention-style business judgment rule).
33. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12. Specifically, the authors of the Proponent
White Paper appear concerned that “a judge may not find it to be appropriate to consider and advance
non-shareholder interests for their own sake (i.e., as part of the company’s mission) and not as a way
of maximizing long-term shareholder financial value.” Id. at 14.

772

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:765

financial interests by the courts in Unocal34 and Revlon35 respectively.36
The Proponent White Paper admits that these cases may be distinguished
and navigated around, but it insists that the uncertainty in the law can lead
to lawsuits if the firm focuses on the financial interests of shareholders.37
The Proponent White Paper admits that some commentators have
thoughtfully argued that one might be able to include a social purpose in a
firm’s certificate of incorporation to avoid the aforementioned issues, but
claims that there is no clear statutory or case law on point, which
supposedly makes firms nervous.38
The rationales for benefit corporations summarized above and
documented by the Proponent White Paper can or have been challenged,
but they remain relevant for this Article and will be picked up again in the
34. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In Unocal, the business
judgment rule is applied only if “the directors can first demonstrate that they were responding to a
legitimate threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, and that their response was ‘reasonable in
relation to the threat posed.’” PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12 (quoting Unocal, 493
A.2d at 949). The Proponent White Paper seemed especially concerned about the language in eBay v.
Newmark which, in the Unocal context, stated: “Directors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot
deploy a [policy] to defend a business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth
maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law.” eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010). The Proponent White Paper also
appears concerned that “Delaware courts will seek to limit the ‘purely philanthropic ends’ of missiondriven companies, especially when their directors’ decisions are reviewed under Unocal’s scrutiny.”
PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 13. But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20:
Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 772 (2006) (citing academics who
have called Unocal a “toothless standard”).
35. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
36. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12–13.
37. Id. at 13. But see Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law
and the Sale of A Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 235–37 (2010) (explaining how “Revlon
duties” can be avoided and how directors may be able to “just say no” to bids for the company); Lyman
Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 224–25 (2013)
(arguing that Revlon is diminishing in importance in Delaware law and arguing that courts should
“reject Revlon’s faulty focus on short-term value maximization”).
38. PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 13. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (West
2016) (“A corporation may be incorporated or organized . . . to conduct or promote any lawful business
or purposes.”). In California, Professor Eric Talley and Jesse Finfrock argued that “the state does not
permit flexibility in the statement of a corporate purpose within a corporate charter, constraining
incorporators instead to utilize a stock set of phrases that do not clearly admit social entrepreneurship
goals.” Jesse Finfrock & Eric Talley, Social Entrepreneurship and Uncorporations, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1867, 1870 (2014). This limitation in California law, coupled with the absence of a constituency
statute, “made it impossible for a for-profit California-incorporated firm to embrace social
entrepreneurship goals in its core governing constitution.” Id. While Talley and Finfrock note the
strong protection of the business judgment rule in California, like the Proponent White Paper authors,
they argue that the protection is limited, stating that “[w]hile the rule grants fiduciaries discretion about
how to serve their shareholder interests, it arguably does not give discretion about whether to do so.
Consequently, for decisions that patently sacrifice shareholder welfare for the benefit of other
considerations (including social purposes), even the BJR provides wavering protection.” Id. (emphasis
in original). The California benefit corporation and social purpose corporation legislation was passed,
at least in part, to address these issues. Id.
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discussions about how investment professionals should treat benefit
corporations below.39
C. Social Purpose Corporations
In 2011, California passed a flexible purpose corporation statute,
which was later renamed a social purpose corporation (SPC) statute.40
Washington is the only other state with a similar SPC statute.41 The
defining feature of the SPC statute is its flexibility in entity purpose.42 The
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation requires a general public purpose
but, in contrast, the SPC allows the required purpose to be significantly
narrower.43 Like benefit corporation statutes, SPC statutes require regular
social reporting.44 Accurate figures on the number of SPCs are not readily
available, but only twenty-three flexible purpose corporations (later called
SPCs) were formed in California in 2012, and it would be surprising if the
number of SPCs in both California and Washington has exceeded 300
entities at the time of this publication.45
II. THE STATE OF SOCIAL INVESTING
Social investing has various facets. This Part begins by briefly
describing the related, but different, concepts of impact investing and
investing that considers environmental, social, and governance factors
(ESG factors). This Part then narrows its focus to consider the place of
social enterprise legal forms, which currently only occupy a small portion
of the overall social investing landscape.

39. See generally J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U.
BUS. L. REV. 85 (2012); Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007 (2013); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social
Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012); Dana
Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 591 (2011).
40. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–2517, 2600–2605, 2700–2702, 2800, 2900, 3000–3002, 3100,
3200–3203, 3300–3306, 3400–3401, 3500–3503 (West 2014).
41. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23B.25.005 to .150 (West 2013).
42. J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 552 (2016)
(explaining that the SPCs “do not require a general public benefit purpose but do require adoption of
one or more specific purposes”).
43. Id.
44. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 89, 107–08 (2015) (discussing the SPC reporting requirements under Washington and
California law).
45. Finfrock & Talley, supra note 38, at 1874–75 (noting that the benefit corporations and FPCs
formed during 2012 make up “less than two-tenths of a percent of the new incorporations within
California during [2012]”).
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A. Impact Investing and ESG Factors
Impact investing has been defined a number of different ways, but
the authors of perhaps the leading book on the topic state that “impact
investors intend to create positive impact alongside various levels of
financial return, both managing and measuring the blended value they
create.”46 Stated differently, the Global Impact Investment Network
(GIIN), a leading nonprofit that supports development of the impact
investment industry, opines that “[i]mpact investments are investments
made into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to
generate social and environmental impact alongside a financial return.
Impact investments can be made in both emerging and developed markets,
and target a range of returns from below-market to market-rate, depending
upon the circumstances.”47 Like the definition of impact investing,
estimates of market size vary, but one survey of 146 impact investors
administered by J.P. Morgan found impact investments in the amount of
$10.6 billion in 2014, with the intention to increase them to $12.2 billion
in 2015, and a total of approximately $60 billion of impact investments
under management.48
While impact investors generally understand social impact as critical
to their investments, many more managers at least consider ESG factors.49
More than 1,400 companies have signed the Principles for Responsible
Investment, which includes a commitment to promoting disclosure on
ESG factors and considering ESG factors when making investments.50
Worldwide, approximately $45 trillion in assets are reportedly being
managed with a commitment to incorporate ESG factors into the
investment decision-making process, though the estimated amount varies
depending on the source and their estimation methods.51
46. ANTONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT INVESTING: TRANSFORMING HOW WE
MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE (2011).
47. What is Impact Investing, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK (GIIN) (2016),
https://thegiin.org/impact-investing/need-to-know/#s1 [https://perma.cc/9A5W-L6HT].
48. Yasemin Saltuk & Ali El Idrissi, Eyes on the Horizon, The Impact Investor Survey 5, GLOBAL
IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK (May 4, 2015), https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/pub/
2015.04%20Eyes%20on%20the%20Horizon.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJ3B-6QXN].
49. Reiser, supra note 2, at 739 n.202 (2013) (discussing some of the definition of impact
investing. Each definition either considers social impact to be an important factor or the most important
factor in investment decisions). But see David A. Levitt, Impact Investing through a Donor Advised
Fund, 25 TAX’N EXEMPTS 3, 4 (2014) (noting that “there is no legal definition of a mission-related or
impact investment, and no legal requirements to qualify for this status”).
50. About the PRI, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTING, https://www.unpri.org/about
[https://perma.cc/JDA8-N7B4]; Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin Sethi, Engagement: The Missing
Middle Approach in the Bebchuk-Strine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 385, 399–400 (2016).
51. Deborah Burand, Resolving Impact Investment Disputes: When Doing Good Goes Bad, 48
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 60 (2015) (citing SOCIAL IMPACT INVESTMENT TASKFORCE, IMPACT
INVESTMENT: THE INVISIBLE HEART OF MARKETS 1 (2014)); see also US SIF: THE FORUM FOR
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B. Publicly Traded Social Enterprises
Most businesses legally organized as social enterprises appear to be
smaller private companies.52 In 2015, Laureate Education, Inc. filed an
S-1 to set up the first benefit corporation initial public offering in the
United States.53 Laureate Education is also the largest benefit corporation,
with more than $4 billion in revenue from 88 institutions, 28 countries,
and 1 million students.54 Plum Organics, a Delaware PBC, is a wholly
owned subsidiary of publicly traded Campbell Soup Company.55 Further,
French company Danone recently acquired WhiteWave Food for roughly
$10 billion and reportedly plans to use a Delaware PBC for WhiteWave’s
operations.56
Other publicly traded benefit corporations are supposedly in the
works. Further, publicly traded, certified B Corporation Etsy will have to
become a benefit corporation, reincorporate in a constituency-statute state,
or lose its certification unless the nonprofit organization in charge of
certification, B Lab, changes its rules regarding certified B corporations.57
The other social enterprise forms, such as social purpose corporations,

SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND
IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS 2014 12 (10th ed.), http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/
SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf [https://perma.cc/A65N-GM38] (showing $6.2 billion in U.S.-domiciled
assets in institutions “that apply various environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria in their
investment analysis and portfolio selection”).
52. Find a Benefit Corp., BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/ [https://perma.cc/5EW836BH ] (providing a database of benefit corporations, most of which appear to be relatively young and
relatively small companies, with some exceptions); L3C Tally, supra note 1 (providing a list of L3Cs,
which appear to be mostly small companies).
53. Alicia Plerhoples, First Benefit Corporation IPO, SOCENTLAW (Oct. 5, 2015),
http://socentlaw.com/2015/10/first-benefit-corporation-ipo/
[https://perma.cc/5HAG-2V97];
Registration Statement: Form S-1, PRACTICAL LAW, http://us.practicallaw.com/0-381-0950
[https://perma.cc/JW3C-76NE] (noting that “Form S-1 is the registration statement form most
commonly used by domestic companies selling securities to the public for the first time”).
54. FAQ: Investing, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/faq [https://perma.cc/YA25BAEQ].
55. Plum Organics, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/community/plumorganics [https://perma.cc/27HU-NAC2].
56. Danone Swallows WhiteWave in $10B Bid to Go Organic, ORGANIC CONSUMERS ASS’N
(July 7, 2016), https://www.organicconsumers.org/news/danone-swallows-whitewave-10b-bid-goorganic [https://perma.cc/R9HV-HW9Z]; E-mail from Rick Alexander, B Lab (July 11, 2016, 06:22
CST) (on file with author).
57. Haskell Murray, Etsy’s Dilemma, BUS. LAW PROF BLOG (March 20, 2015),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/03/etsys-dilemma-.html
[https://perma.cc/
GGB9-5JNT]; Haskell Murray, Certified B Corporations v. Benefit Corporations, CONGLOMERATE
(May 3, 2012), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/05/certified-b-corporations-v-benefitcorporations.html [https://perma.cc/EPM6-K7J5] (explaining the differences between B corporation
certification (a private certification awarded by B Lab after a test and payment of a fee) and the legal
status of a benefit corporation (one of the options for legal entity status provided by certain states and
obtained through incorporating under one of the benefit corporation statutes)).
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Benefit LLCs, and L3Cs, currently have no known publicly traded
companies.
C. Private, Outside Funding of Social Enterprises
Data on businesses formed under social enterprise statutes that have
received venture capital, private equity, or other private, outside funding
is difficult to uncover. A few of the known companies are detailed here.
Alliant International University, a California benefit corporation, is funded
and controlled by Bertelsmann, a large, German mass-media company.58
AltSchool, a Delaware public benefit corporation, raised $100 million
from Andreessen Horowitz, Founders Fund, Learn Capital, and First
Round Capital in 2015.59 Farmigo, a Delaware public benefit corporation,
raised a total of $26 million from investment firms Formation 8,
Benchmark, and Sherbrooke Capital.60 Yerdle, a California benefit
corporation, raised $5 million in Series-A financing from venture capital
funds including, The Westly Group, Mindful Investors, and DBL
Investors.61 Ello, a Delaware public benefit corporation, raised $5.5
million from Freshtracks Capital, Bullet Time Ventures, and Foundry
Group.62 Cotopaxi, a Delaware public benefit corporation, raised $6.5
million in a Series-A raise led by the venture capital firm Greycroft
Partners.63 Year Up Professional Resources (YUPRO) is a Delaware
public benefit corporation that received $4.5 million investment from
58. Doug Lederman, Blurring the Nonprofit/For-Profit Divide, INSIDE HIGH. ED (Feb. 23, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/02/23/nonprofit-university-becomes-benefitcorporation-further-blurring-profit-divide
[https://perma.cc/A7ZR-AYEH];
Kristin
DeCarr,
Bertelsmann Takes Controlling Stake in Alliant, EDUC. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://www.educationnews.org/higher-education/bertelsmann-takes-controlling-stake-in-alliant/
[https://perma.cc/LP5F-D3GN]; E-mail from Jonathan S. Storper, Hanson Bridgett LLP (June 9, 2016,
20:27 CST) (on file with author).
59. Benefit Corporations Raising Capital, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/benefitcorporations-raising-capital [https://perma.cc/3LG3-WHDN].
60. Anthony Ha, Farmigo Raises $16M For A New Approach To The Farmers’ Market, TECH
CRUNCH (Sept. 30, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/09/30/farmigo-series-b/ [https://perma.cc/
Z6NQ-VXN7]; RSF Capital Management Registers as One of Delaware’s first Benefit Corporations!,
RSF SOC. FIN. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://rsfsocialfinance.org/2013/08/01/rsf-de-benefit-corporation/
[https://perma.cc/W5J5-ESWK] (listing some of the first Delaware public benefit corporations,
including Farmigo, and the major investors in those companies).
61. Benefit Corporations Raising Capital, supra note 59.
62. Id.; Haskell Murray, Ello and Social Enterprise, BUS. LAW PROF BLOG (Oct. 24, 2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/10/ello-and-social-enterprise.html
[https://perma.cc/ZXZ6-GVSF].
63. Benefit Corporations Raising Capital, supra note 59; BENEFIT CORPORATION REPORT,
COTOPAXI,
https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0281/7544/files/Cotopaxi-2015-Benefit-CorporationReport.pdf?6577560737617330421 [https://perma.cc/8CB4-BPM4] (noting the company’s legal
status as a Delaware public benefit corporation, though they incorrectly use the term “benefit
corporation,” rather than “public benefit corporation”).
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Venture Philanthropy Partners, “a nonprofit philanthropic investment
organization,” in 2009, before YUPRO converted to a PBC.64 Method, a
Delaware public benefit corporation, was supported in its transition to a
Delaware public benefit corporation by Ecover, its acquirer, in 2013.65
Beta Bionics, a Massachusetts benefit corporation, raised $5 million
dollars from Eli Lilly in 2016.66 Maine’s Own Organic (MOO) Milk, a
Vermont-organized L3C, raised more than $3.9 million in 2013 (bringing
the total amount raised close to $6 million), before winding down
operations in 2014.67
There are quite a number of investment providers that are specifically
interested in the social investing space, including Acumen Fund, Gray
Ghost Ventures, Root Capital, RSF Social Finance, Slow Money, and
Village Capital. However, these investment organizations do not appear to
be exclusively focused on businesses that have utilized the social
enterprise legal forms.68 In addition, some of the investment organizations,
like RSF Capital Management, PBC (a wholly owned subsidiary of RSF
Social Finance) and Flexible Capital Fund, L3C, are organized as social
enterprises themselves.69

64. Press Release, Year Up, Year Up and VPP Enter $4.5 Million Investment Partnership
(Nov.
9,
2009),
http://www.yearup.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/YearUpVPP_pr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8UAS-8UEK].
65. Ryan Honeyman, Can B Corp Certification Help You Raise Capital?, TRIPLE PUNDIT
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.triplepundit.com/2014/09/can-b-corp-certification-help-raise-capital/#
[https://perma.cc/AC82-M38U].
66. Beta
Bionics
Raises
$5
Million,
TERRIER TECH
(Apr.
5,
2016),
http://blogs.bu.edu/otd/2016/04/05/beta-bionics-raises-5/ [https://perma.cc/269A-L37Z].
67. Jessica Hall, MOOMilk Attracts $3.9 Million in New Investment, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD
(May 29, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013/05/29/moo-milk/; J. Craig Anderson, Maine’s
MOO Milk to Shut Down, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD
(May
16,
2014),
http://www.pressherald.com/2014/05/16/maine_s_own_organic_milk__known_as_moo__to_shut_d
own_/ [https://perma.cc/V6V3-26R6] (noting the private funding raised and the large amount of
investor money to be lost).
68. MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS
188–201 (2011) (providing descriptions and listings of funding sources for social enterprises).
69. RSF Capital Management, PBC, BCORPORATION.NET, https://www.bcorporation.net/
community/rsf-capital-management [https://perma.cc/4LC5-G9RC]; Flexible Capital Fund Invests
$600,000 in Royalty Financing to Two Growing Vermont Companies, VT. SUSTAINABLE JOBS FUND
(Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.vsjf.org/news/96/flexible-capital-fund-invests-600000-in-royaltyfinancing-to-two-growing-vermont-companies [https://perma.cc/63CV-YN2F].
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III. ERISA AND ECONOMICALLY TARGETED INVESTMENTS
A. ERISA Title I, Sections 403 and 404
Sections 403 and 404 of ERISA require plan fiduciaries to act for the
exclusive benefit of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries.70
Specifically, Section 404 requires that a plan fiduciary “discharge his
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries” and requires “care, skill, prudence, and diligence” and
diversification.71 Under the text of Sections 403 and 404, it is not entirely
clear whether ETI investments made for financial returns and collateral
social benefits were appropriate for plan investments or would be subject
to special scrutiny.72 The following sections in this Part analyze guidance
from the DOL on this issue.
B. Interpretive Bulletin of 1994
In 1994, under the Clinton Administration,73 the DOL issued
Interpretive Bulletin 1994-1 (IB 94-1), which “corrected a misperception
that investments in ETIs are incompatible with ERISA’s fiduciary
obligations.”74 IB 94-1 was commonly called the “all things being equal”
test because plan fiduciaries were permitted to consider the social benefits
70. Peter E. Haller & Peter J. Allman, DOL Clarifies Guidance on Economically Targeted
Investments, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.willkie.com/~/media/
Files/Publications/2015/10/DOL_Clarifies_Guidance_on_Economically_Targeted_Investments.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SC67-YLCK]. See generally Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto
& Anne M. Tucker, Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 73 (2015).
71. ERISA § 404(a)(1) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)) (emphasis added); see also Edward
A. Zelinsky, The Continuing Battle Over Economically Targeted Investments: An Analysis of DOL
Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 3–4 (2016) (explaining the text of section
404).
72. Tom Perez, United States Secretary of Labor, Press Conference Announcing New ERISA
Guidance on Economically Targeted Investments (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/_sec/
media/speeches/20151022_Perez.htm [https://perma.cc/AKF2-DMZP] (noting that ETI “is known by
a number of terms—’environmental, social and governance’, or ESG, investing; sustainable and
responsible investing, impact investing.”).
73. The administrations under which the guidance was issued are important to note, because as
Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein wrote roughly twenty years ago, “[t]he ongoing debate over economically
targeted investments is primarily about power and politics and only secondarily about pensions.” Jayne
Elizabeth Zanglein, Protecting Retirees While Encouraging Economically Targeted Investments, 5
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 47 (1996); see also Rado Bohinc & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate
Governance in Post-Privatized Slovenia, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 49, 64 (2001) (noting the politicization
of public pensions and social investing).
74. New Guidance on Economically Targeted Investments in Retirement Plans from US Labor
Department, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/ebsa20152045.htm
[https://perma.cc/DJ2R-NQ9W] [hereinafter New Guidance on Economically Targeted Investments].
See generally, Edward A. Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments: A Critical Analysis, 6 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (1997); Zanglein, supra note 73.
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of an investment, if the financial returns were projected to be equal to or
better than alternative investments.75 Edward Zelinsky opined that
“IB 94-1 encouraged employee benefit trusts to make social investments
designated as ETIs” because it stated that ETIs may be properly selected
for their collateral social benefits, without violating the applicable duty of
loyalty, if those investments are prudent investments.76
C. Interpretive Bulletin of 2008
Effective October 17, 2008, under the George W. Bush
Administration, the DOL issued Interpretive Bulletin 2008-01 (IB 08-01),
which stated that “ERISA’s plain text does not permit fiduciaries to make
investment decisions on the basis of any factor other than the economic
interest of the plan.”77 IB 08-01 replaced IB 94-1 and made clear that
“fiduciaries may never subordinate the economic interests of the plan to
unrelated objectives.”78 Later, however, IB 08-01 noted that in situations
where multiple investments were equal from an economic perspective,
fiduciaries were free to use other factors, such as ESG factors, as a
tiebreaker.79 IB 08-01 warned “that fiduciary consideration of
noneconomic factors should be rare,” and that collateral considerations
could only be considered “in very limited circumstances.”80 Causing some
concern, IB 08-01 cautioned that it would be difficult to rely on
noneconomic factors and stay in compliance with the strict ERISA
guidelines “absent a written record demonstrating that a contemporaneous
economic analysis showed that the investment alternatives were of equal
value.”81 As U.S. Secretary of Labor Tom Perez noted, “Even if the ‘all
75. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder
Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1079–80 (1998); Craig A. Bitman & Michael B.
Richman, DOL Issues New Guidance on Economically Targeted Investments, MORGAN LEWIS (Nov.
5, 2015), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/dol-issues-new-guidance-on-economically-targetedinvestments [https://perma.cc/75ZQ-89J6] (noting that IB 94-01 “set forth the ‘all things being equal’
test”); Perez, supra note 72 (stating that ETI “is known by a number of terms—‘environmental, social
and governance’, or ESG, investing; sustainable and responsible investing, impact investing.”); Geczy,
Jeffers, Musto & Tucker, supra note 70, at 86–87 (noting that IB 94-01 did not allow fiduciaries to
take lower returns and/or greater risk to invest in ETIs).
76. See Zelinsky, supra note 71, at 6.
77. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Investing in Economically Targeted Investments, 73 Fed.
Reg. 61734, 61735 (Oct. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) [hereinafter IB 08-01].
78. Id.; New Guidance on Economically Targeted Investments, supra note 74.
79. IB 08-01, supra note 77.
80. Id.; Perez, supra note 72; Bitman & Richman, supra note 75. See generally Edward A.
Zelinsky, Interpretive Bulletin 08-1 and Economically Targeted Investing: A Missed Opportunity, 82
S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 11 (2009).
81. IB 08-01, supra note 77; Susan Mac Cormac et al., Department of Labor Clarifies ERISA
Fiduciary Requirements With Respect to Economically Targeted Investments and Environmental,
Social, and Governance Goals, MORRISON FOERSTER (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.mofo.com/~/
media/Files/ClientAlert/2015/11/151112DepartmentofLaborClarifiesERISA.pdf
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things being equal test’ nominally hadn’t changed [after the issuance of IB
08-01], in many quarters it was understood to have changed . . . . The 2008
guidance gave cooties to impact investing.”82
D. Interpretive Bulletin of 2015
On October 26, 2015, under the Obama Administration, the DOL
issued Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01 (IB 15-01) to clarify what it
considered confusion and misinterpretation of the DOL’s intent in
IB 08-01.83 The DOL concluded that “IB 2008-01 has unduly discouraged
fiduciaries from considering ETIs and ESG factors.”84 Specifically, the
DOL was concerned that IB 08-01 discouraged plan fiduciaries from
considering ETIs and ESG factors even if ETIs were equal or better
economically and even when only using the permissible ESG factors to
determine economic value of the investments.85 In IB 15-01, the DOL
sought to make clear that a plan fiduciary may, and should, consider ESG
factors that “potentially influence risk and return.”86 Also, IB 15-01 made
clear that “[f]iduciaries need not treat commercially reasonable
investments as inherently suspect or in need of special scrutiny merely
because they take into consideration environmental, social, or other
factors.”87 Further, if an investment is justified on its economic merits,
collateral goals are not needed as tiebreakers.88 The DOL clarified that
additional documentation was not presumptively necessary for ETIs or
when considering ESG factors; rather, appropriate documentation depends
on the facts and circumstances of each investment decision.89 The DOL
reaffirmed that plan fiduciaries must stay focused on the economic
benefits of investments: “an investment will not be prudent if it would be
expected to provide a plan with a lower rate of return than available
alternative investments with commensurate degrees of risk or is riskier
[https://perma.cc/Q4QW-A2C4] (noting that some worried that IB 2008 required additional recordkeeping, above and beyond those kept for normal investment decisions. In 2015, the DOL clarified
that making ESG investments does not presumptively require additional documentation).
82. Perez, supra note 72.
83. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering
Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65135-01 (Oct. 26, 2015) [hereinafter IB 15-01].
84. IB 15-01, supra note 83.
85. Id.; Haller & Allman, supra note 70 (noting, however, that ESG factors need to be considered
for their economic impact).
86. IB 15-01, supra note 83; Perez, supra note 72 (commenting on IB 2015, Secretary Perez
stated, “[j]ust because a project has social impact, that should not be a strike against it. Nor should it
be a decisive argument for it”).
87. IB 15-01, supra note 83.
88. Id.
89. Id.; Haller & Allman, supra note 70 (stating that the “new guidance also makes clear that
fiduciaries are not required to maintain any special or additional documentation to demonstrate
compliance with ERISA’s fiduciary rules when considering ETIs or ESG factors”).
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than alternative available investments with commensurate rates of
return.”90 Finally, through IB 15-01, the DOL withdrew IB 08-01 and
reinstated IB 94-1, hopefully removing the stigma from ETIs without
elevating them above other investments.91
IV. WALKING THE LINE: PROFIT AND PURPOSE
ETIs have long been a source of debate among ERISA scholars.
Some argue for disallowing any nonfinancial considerations while others
argue for allowing nonfinancial considerations that do not negatively
impact the economic returns.92 Firms that choose a social enterprise legal
form, such as a benefit corporation, may place even more tension between
profit and purpose than a typical ETI.93 As explained below, ERISA
trustees should be cautious with new social enterprise forms because the
social enterprise statutes were passed, at least in part, to allow directors to
sacrifice profits for purpose.94 Benefit corporations, and other social
enterprises, however, may choose not to sacrifice profits, but rather may
use the publicity of their social entity status to attract customers and
employees, leading to a stronger financial bottom line. Accordingly,
investment professionals should closely monitor and evaluate the
strategies of social enterprises and, in cases where ERISA applies, be sure
to invest only in social enterprises that pursue a strategy aimed at
achieving a full market return.

90. IB 15-01, supra note 83.
91. Haller & Allman, supra note 70; Perez, supra note 72 (making clear that IB 2015 “is not a
thumb on the [social impact] side of the scale. What we’re doing today in no way compromises the
financial health of retirement plans or their participants. . . . Indeed, today’s announcement reaffirms
that ERISA fiduciaries may not accept lower returns or incur greater risks in the name of collateral
benefits.”).
92. See infra Part IV.A.
93. Reiser, supra note 2, at 684 (“[E]ventually there will have to be decisions where profit and
social good come into conflict and must be traded off.”); John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of
Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV.
117, 117–18 (2010) (noting the seemingly irreconcilable conflict in the purpose of serving shareholder
interests and the purpose of serving other stakeholder interests in social enterprises); cf. Barnali
Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm,
11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 646–47 (2009) (noting that “corporate managers should also be able to serve
both the financial interests of shareholders and the interests of non-shareholder corporate constituents
through use of the ambiguity of the corporate purpose. . . . [T]he lack of clarity in the corporate purpose
suggests corporate law can neither commit itself to an exclusive profit maximization mandate nor to
operating as a vehicle for the creation of societal wealth. The truth of the corporate purpose must, then,
somehow lie between these two positions.” But admitting that it may be the case that “both masters
cannot always be served at the same time.”).
94. See supra Part I.B.
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A. Economically Targeted Investments and ERISA
The debate over ETIs and ERISA significantly predates discussion
of social enterprises.95 Edward Zelinsky has spoken out against ETIs as
inappropriate under ERISA, and has opined that
[e]conomically targeted investing contravenes ERISA’s duty of
loyalty by permitting, indeed encouraging, plan trustees to invest plan
assets to generate ancillary benefits for persons other than the
participants whose labor is embodied in those assets. . . .
Economically targeted investing is neither a coherent concept nor a
concept compatible with ERISA’s duty of loyalty.96

On the other hand, Jane Elizabeth Zanglein has argued that “[t]he prudence
rule sufficiently protects retirees from inappropriate, below-market
investments” and, therefore, ETI investing should be allowed when the
investment risk and returns are equivalent to other available options.97
Zelinsky replies that ERISA’s Section 404 states that “a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries,” and “solely means solely.”98 Zelinsky is
not convinced that trustees can put their personal social preferences aside;
he writes that he would prefer trustees to “flip a coin” when choosing
among economically identical investments because that would “not
introduce into the decisionmaking process considerations which,
unconsciously or deliberately, can skew that process.”99 Scholars seem to
agree, however, that under ERISA, financial returns cannot be
intentionally sacrificed for collateral benefits to third parties and society
at large.100
B. Social Enterprise, Benefit Corporations, and ERISA
Due to benefit corporations being the most popular social enterprise
entity type and the only type currently attracting publicly traded firms, this

95. See, e.g., Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Finance,
85 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (1997); Zanglein, supra note 73; Zelinsky, supra note 74.
96. Zelinsky, supra note 80, at 12.
97. Zanglein, supra note 73, at 55.
98. ERISA § 404(a)(1) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)) (emphasis added); see Zelinsky,
supra note 71, at 10–13 (writing that “[t]rustees must pursue beneficiaries’ interests ‘solely’ and
‘exclusively.’ Anything less opens the door of the fiduciary decisionmaking process to influences
which are potentially detrimental to the beneficiaries’ welfare.”).
99. See Zelinsky, supra note 71, at 12.
100. As a normative matter, however, David Webber has argued that trustees should be allowed
to consider the personal and professional interests of investors, not merely their financial interests.
David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106,
2126–56 (2014).
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section will focus on benefit corporations.101 A main justification for the
benefit corporation statutory scheme is that it more clearly allows
decisions that will benefit various stakeholders but will not benefit
shareholders, even in the long run.102 If social entrepreneurs were only
attempting to make decisions that would benefit nonshareholders in the
short-run but redound to the benefit of shareholders in the long-run, the
traditional corporate form would be sufficient given the protection of the
business judgment rule.103 Even in the takeover defense and company sale
situations, firms could pursue social ends that arguably have a positive
long-term result for shareholders by “just saying no,” retaining high voting
shares, or simply incorporating in a constituency statute state.104 Thus, the
pitch that benefit corporation proponents have to make to states
considering this entity legislation is that, in essence, benefit corporations
are needed for the times when for-profit firms want to admit to pursuing
social ends at the short and long-term expense of shareholders.105
ERISA fiduciaries, on the other hand, can only make economically
targeted investments when the expected financial return is equal to or
greater than other available options.106 This profit-focused expectation
makes benefit corporations risky bets for ERISA fiduciaries. The
empirical findings on returns for social investments are mixed, and we are
too early in the benefit corporation history to have convincing data on the
returns of these firms.107 As shown, benefit corporations are only needed,
101. See supra Part I.
102. See supra Part I.B.
103. Alina Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2016).
104. See, e.g., Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and
the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 233–42 (2010) (discussing the many ways
Ben & Jerry’s could have avoided “selling out” to Unilever, in, perhaps, the most discussed social
business acquisition of the last twenty-five years).
105. Granted, there are other arguments that benefit corporation proponents could make, such as
the benefit corporation statutes are useful because they require consideration of major stakeholders,
drafting of regular social reports, and use of a third-party standard to measure social impact. All of
these things, however, could be required by a traditional for-profit firm, as long as decisions were tied
to shareholder interests in some way; the need for benefit corporations is most clear when firms wish
to subordinate shareholder interests, both in the short- and long-term. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our
Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
135, 155 (2012) (“I do not mean to imply that the corporate law requires directors to maximize shortterm profits for stockholders. Rather, I simply indicate that the corporate law requires directors, as a
matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.
The directors, of course, retain substantial discretion, outside the context of a change of control, to
decide how best to achieve that goal and the appropriate time frame for delivering those returns.”).
106. See supra Part III.
107. See Rado Bohinc & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance in
Post-Privatized Slovenia, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 49, 64 (2001) (“[S]ocial investing has substantial costs
in the form of reduced returns to investors. In general, the greater the extent to which a public pension
fund is subject to direct political control, the worse its investment returns.”); David Hess, Public
Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier of Corporate Governance:
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as a matter of corporate law, to provide shelter for firms that wish to openly
sacrifice profits in pursuit of social ends.108 To be clear, profit-focused
firms may choose the benefit corporation form solely for marketing and
financial purposes, and that would not pose the same risk to ERISA
fiduciaries. Moreover, considering nonshareholder constituents in
decision-making does not doom benefit corporations to below-market
returns, and an ERISA fiduciary may be able to claim that such a holistic
approach to the corporation is financially beneficial in the long term. In
the company sale area, the benefit corporation statute sets entities up to
potentially capture significantly less capital because they must consider a
wide range of stakeholders. Unlike most constituency statutes, which are
permissive, benefit corporation statutes are mandatory, and benefit
corporations risk lawsuits from activist shareholders if they do not
properly consider (or balance) stakeholder interests.109 Thus, directors,
fearing lawsuits from activist shareholders, for not properly considering
stakeholders, may take a lower bid for the company.110 Even if benefit
corporation directors take the highest financial offer, they face a more
significant litigation risk than traditional corporations from shareholders
unhappy with the consideration and ultimate treatment of nonshareholder
constituents.111 In the sale context, benefit corporations could first switch
to a traditional corporation with a two-thirds vote; this ability, however,
Sustainable Economic Development, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 221, 260 (2007) (“Although some early
studies showed that ETIs had a negative impact on pension performance, these studies used data from
before the mid-1990s, when the Department of Labor issued a statement that ETIs were appropriate if
the expected rate of return was comparable to that of alternative investments of a similar risk. More
recent studies, including those using data after the Department of Labor’s announcement, have not
found a negative relationship between the use of ETIs and fund performance.”); Terrance P. McGuire,
A Blueprint for Growth or A Recipe for Disaster? State Sponsored Venture Capital Funds for High
Technology Ventures, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 435 (1994) (“Efficient market theory suggests that
if the market is functioning correctly, a program focused exclusively on ETIs may produce belowmarket rates of return. Put simply, states must place a priority on either maximizing profits, or
maximizing job creation and community development.”); Geczy, Jeffers, Musto & Tucker, supra note
70, at 87–88; Smith, supra note 95, at 31–32 (noting “investment returns on public-sector pension
plans in states with ETI requirements were one percent lower than in states without such
requirements”).
108. See supra Part I.B.
109. Granted, “consider” is a low standard and there may not be many activist shareholders with
sufficient interest and resources to bring such a lawsuit.
110. Strine, Jr., supra note 105, at 152–55 (noting that shareholders are the only ones with a vote
and the only ones with the right to sue derivatively in corporate law, and thus corporate social
responsibility is likely to have minimal impact on directorial action).
111. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 605 (1992) (stating, in the constituency statute context
that it “is the predictable reaction that this limited enforcement mechanism stimulates in corporate
directors. If stockholders pose the sole internal threat to directors’ exercise of their otherwise
untrammelled discretion, then the directors’ best means of protecting themselves from litigation is to
act in, or at least to ascribe their actions to, the stockholders’ interests.”).
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diminishes the argument benefit corporation proponents make about the
social commitment being made by choosing the form.112 While it does not
appear that ERISA fiduciaries must avoid benefit corporations altogether,
they may need to proceed with extreme caution given that a primary reason
benefit corporations are needed is for firms wishing to pursue social ends,
at the expense of financial returns.
V. CURRENT AND FUTURE PLACE FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE INVESTING
A. Venture Capital and Private Equity
There are certain investment professionals, such as venture
capitalists and private equity specialists, who manage money exclusively
or almost exclusively for high-net-worth individuals and sophisticated
organizations.113 These venture capital and private equity professionals
have traditionally been given far greater flexibility and have been
burdened by significantly less regulation than professionals managing
funds covered by ERISA. Venture capital funds tend to be organized as
limited partnerships, and limited partnership law—especially in
Delaware—gives great deference to the contracts entered into by the
partners.114 Many, if not most, venture capitalists organize their funds
under Delaware law, which allows waiver or modification of statutory
fiduciary duties and provides the ability to craft their own terms.115
Venture capitalists tend to have relatively limited restraints from business
law or from their contracts with investors, which tend to give venture
capitalists a great deal of discretion.116 As a general matter of Delaware
business law, general partners owe duties of loyalty and care to limited
partners.117 In Delaware, those default duties can be eliminated by
contract, though the contract will not eliminate the narrow, implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.118 Venture capitalists, however,
112. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 235, 247 (2014) (noting the difficulty in securing a two-thirds vote and opining that the
requirement could be “outcome-determinative” in mergers and acquisitions situations involving
benefit corporations).
113. PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 7 (1999).
114. David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract,
2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 375–82 (2002).
115. Id. at 370–71.
116. David Rosenberg, The Two “Cycles” of Venture Capital, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 419, 421,
428 (2003); see also Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, supra note 114, at 367–68
(“[T]he managers of venture capital funds have virtually no general legal obligation to behave in the
best interest of their investors.”). Rosenberg argues that reputational risks act as a safeguard for
investors in the absence of significant legal protection. Id. at 366.
117. Sonet v. Timber Co., L.P., 722 A.2d 319, 322 (Del. Ch. 1998).
118. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, 40 A.3d 839, 851–53 (Del. Ch. 2012), judgment
entered sub nom., (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2012), aff’d, (Del. Nov. 07, 2012); see also Mohsen Manesh,
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often modify and specify the duties owed through contract.119 Even if not
bound by law, venture capitalists are often held in check by nonlegal
means, such as concern for their reputation.120
Contractarians, like Larry Ribstein, have argued for this flexibility in
the alternative entity or “uncorporation” context, including the flexibility
to modify or even eliminate fiduciary duties.121 There has been significant
debate over whether general partners, as a default, should owe fiduciary
duties to the limited partners, but most state laws seems to side with default
duties currently.122 The freedom of contract, given uncorporate firms, such
as limited partnerships and limited liability companies, has its detractors.
For example, Sandra Miller has argued for “mandatory minimum
standards to govern business relationships,” such as those in traditional
corporations, and Reza Dibadj has argued that contracts alone are
insufficient to protect investors in uncorporations.123 Likewise, Bill
Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs
and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 560–67 (2012) (describing Delaware law and the academic debate
surrounding duties in LPs and LLCs).
119. See Rosenberg, Two “Cycles” of Venture Capitalism, supra note 116, at 431–32.
120. Id. at 421.
121. Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Entities, 54 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 537, 541 (1997).
122. Mohsen Manesh, Damning Dictum: The Default Duty Debate in Delaware, 39 J. CORP. L.
35, 42–43 (2013), citing Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 170
(Del. 2002). Default fiduciary duties are also present in LLCs, though there was a protracted debate
on this topic between former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Myron Steele (arguing
against default fiduciary duties in the LLC context) and current Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme
Court Leo Strine (arguing in favor of default fiduciary duties in the LLC context). Chief Justice
Strine’s view was ultimately accepted. See Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default
Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS.
L.J. 221, 223 (2009); see also Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, 40 A.3d 839, 849–57 (Del. Ch.
2012) (where then Chancellor Strine wrote that “because the LLC Act provides for principles of equity
to apply, because LLC managers are clearly fiduciaries, and because fiduciaries owe the fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care, the LLC Act starts with the default that managers of LLCs owe enforceable
fiduciary duties”); Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1218–20 (Del. 2012)
(stating that the Delaware Court of Chancery’s “pronouncements [regarding the existence of default
fiduciary duties in the LLC context] must be regarded as dictum without any precedential value. . . .
We remind Delaware judges that the obligation to write judicial opinions on the issues presented is
not a license to use those opinions as a platform from which to propagate their individual world views
on issues not presented.”); Ann E. Conaway & Peter I. Tsoflias, Challenging Traditional Thought: No
Default Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Liability Companies After Auriga, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L.
1, 32–33 (2011) (agreeing with Chief Justice Steele and arguing against default fiduciary duties in the
LLC context); Bruce E. Falby and John L. Reed, Delaware Amends Its LLC Act: Managers and
Controllers Owe Fiduciary Duties Unless LLC Agreement Provides Otherwise, DLA PIPER PUBL’NS
(Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2013/08/delaware-amendsits-llc-act--managers-and-contro/ [https://perma.cc/X2PQ-P6TS].
123. Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, 41 TULSA L. REV.
451, 475 (2006); Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the
Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1609, 1653–54 (2004).
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Callison, Allan Vestal, and Daniel Kleinberger have argued for limits on
the contractarian approach.124
Venture capitalists and their investors tend to be financially
sophisticated.125 While investors in venture capital funds tend to be fairly
passive, venture capitalists themselves are incredibly active and generally
involved with the companies in which their venture capital funds invest.126
Venture capitalists have a plethora of tools at their disposal to constrain
agency costs, including: “(1) the use of staged investment; (2) the use of
equity-based compensation; (3) the retention of control and monitoring
rights; (4) the sale of convertible preferred stock; and (5) the ability to
syndicate investments.”127 While typical shareholders may have many of
these rights in theory, venture capitalists have the ability, in practice, to
use these tools more effectively.128 Given the sophistication of these types
of investors and the flexibility afforded by their contracts, venture
capitalists and private equity professionals may be in a much better
position to invest in social enterprises. As noted in an earlier section, it
already seems like most of the funding flowing to benefit corporations and
other social enterprises is coming from venture capitalists, some of whom
are focused on social investing in general or have raised money for a
specific fund focused on social investing.129
124. J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, Contractarianism and Its Discontents: Reflections
on Unincorporated Business Organization Law Reform, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 493, 504–06 (2009)
(noting some of the risks associated with an “extreme contractarian approach,” such as the opportunity
for managerial abuse and the limiting of judicial action); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of
“Alternative Entities”: From Tax Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 445, 465–71 (2009) (arguing that allowing elimination of fiduciaries’
duties in LLCs exposes the weaker party and departs from the history of business law).
125. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 107–08 (2012) (noting the sophistication of venture capital firms and the terms they require
and the risks they take); Elizabeth Cosenza, Co-Invest at Your Own Risk: An Exploration of Potential
Remedial Theories for Breaches of Rights of First Refusal in the Venture Capital Context, 55 AM. U.
L. REV. 87, 133 (2005); Deborah A. DeMott, Agency and the Unincorporated Firm: Reflections on
Design on the Same Plane of Interest, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 595, 606 (1997); Andrew A. Schwartz,
Corporate Legacy, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 237, 249 (2015) (noting the sophistication and experience
of venture capitalists and private equity investors); Rosenberg, Two “Cycles” of Venture Capitalism,
supra note 116, at 421 n.9 (2003) (assuming that most venture capital investors understand the
riskiness of their investing). But see Joseph Bankman & Marcus Cole, The Venture Capital Investment
Bust: Did Agency Costs Play A Role? Was It Something Lawyers Helped Structure?, 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 211, 215 (2001) (noting that some venture capitalists, especially those with limited experience,
may attract less sophisticated investors).
126. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Partnerships Revisited, 67 CIN. L. REV. 953, 958 (1999) (noting
that investors in venture capital funds are generally passive and that the venture capitalists are given
wide discretion); Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, supra note 114, at 373–74 (noting
the “singular influence [of venture capitalists] that is atypical of shareholders in a corporation”).
127. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 52 (2006).
128. See generally Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, supra note 114.
129. See supra Part II.C.
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B. Further Department of Labor Clarification Needed?
At this stage, additional clarification is probably not needed to
address social enterprise investing (specifically, benefit corporation
investing) for ERISA fiduciaries. For starters, benefit corporations are just
now starting to enter the public markets and are doing so in extremely
small numbers, which might make specific guidance more confusing than
useful. Also, benefit corporations are quite diverse and neither granting a
blanket safe harbor nor a blanket prohibition would be the best path. The
guidance in all three DOL bulletins discussed is clear that financial returns
should not be sacrificed, though the bulletins differ in the amount of
caution or encouragement they provide in regard to ETIs.130 As such,
ERISA fiduciaries are still directed to focus on the financial returns
available from the investments, and are clearly permitted to consider ESG
factors as those factors relate to potential financial returns.131 The guidance
under IB 15-01, which purports to encourage ETIs (or at least not
discourage them), should not be broadened, as doing so might
unintentionally increase the likelihood of underinformed or personally
interested investment decisions.132 Under IB 15-01, ERISA fiduciaries
may be able to properly consider benefit corporations, but should be aware
that some benefit corporations may be pursuing projects with belowmarket returns.133 Given this fact, additional documentation supporting the
reasoning of the ERISA fiduciary, while not expressly required by IB 1501, may be wise.
C. Finding a Place for Social Enterprise Investing
Where does the current guidance leave benefit corporations and those
wishing to do impact investing more generally? The uncertainty, even if
slight, may lead ERISA fiduciaries to avoid benefit corporations even if
they warm up to ETIs in general because benefit corporations have express
permission to sacrifice shareholder interests, in the short and long term,
for general public benefit. To be sure, the benefit corporation statutes
based on the Model require “consideration” of shareholder interests, but
the statutes do not require that anything be done to address that interest.134
The Delaware version of the benefit corporation statute, under which
Laureate Education, Inc. is incorporated, requires “balancing” of

130. See supra Part III.
131. Id.
132. See generally Zelinsky, supra note 71.
133. Cf. id.
134. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a) (2016) (stating that directors “shall consider the
effects of any action or inaction upon [a long list of corporate stakeholders]”) (emphasis added).
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shareholder interests, which seems more significant and may give ERISA
fiduciaries a bit more comfort.135
One possible solution to the uncertainty is shifting the decision to the
plan participants. Give the plan participants the ability to opt into benefit
corporation investments in their plans. These participants, however, are
generally rationally apathetic and sometimes ignorant, as well. 136 This
apathy might lead them to ignore the opt-in entirely, but their ignorance
may lead them to blindly check a box for benefit corporations merely
because it sounds nice. Anne Tucker has described “citizen shareholders”
as “the growing group of investors who enter the market through
employer-sponsored defined contribution plans by investing in mutual
funds, whose choices are structurally constrained, and who bear the risks
of the market without the benefit of ownership rights extended to
traditional shareholders.”137 As recent scholarship has noted, even detailed
disclosures and explanations about the investment options may not be able
to solve the ignorance.138
These impact investments, for now, may be better regulated to more
sophisticated investors who can determine and contractually customize the
appropriate balance of purpose and profit for their tastes. In the securities
law arena, accredited investors are given less protection because they are
thought to be able to defend themselves, either due to financial resources
or financial sophistication.139
135. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2011 & Supp. 2015) (stating that a “public benefit
corporation shall be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best
interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the public benefit or public
benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation”) (emphasis added); see also J. Haskell Murray,
Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. Rev.
345, 355 (2014) (discussing the debate over the word “consider” in the Model and “balance” in the
Delaware public benefit corporation law, and opining that “balance” was more substantial and
onerous).
136. Christopher Gulinello, The Retail-Investor Vote: Mobilizing Rationally Apathetic
Shareholders to Preserve or Challenge the Board’s Presumption of Authority, 2010 UTAH L. REV.
547, 565, 578–83 (2010) (discussing the argument regarding ignorant shareholders and the tendency
of retail shareholders to be apathetic); Anne M. Tucker, Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage of
Citizen Shareholders, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 163, 163 (2015) (noting “[i]ndirect investors—especially
mutual fund investors—are often low-dollar, low-incentive, rationally apathetic investors facing
enormous information asymmetries and collective action problems”).
137. Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to Reflect How
and Why A Majority of Americans Invest in the Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299, 1308 (2012).
138. See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
139. See Martin Goodlett, Subjective Materiality and the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets,
61 DEPAUL L. REV. 165, 190 (2011) (stating that “[a]ccredited investors operate in the financial
markets with fewer restrictions than ordinary investors, but they also operate with diminished
protections”); Jeffrey J. Hass, Small Issue Public Offerings Conducted over the Internet: Are They
“Suitable” for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 134 (1998). But see Howard M. Friedman,
On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 299–301 (1994) (noting that
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We remain in the nascent stages of social enterprise, especially in the
publicly traded arena. In the future, we will be able to better measure the
financial returns of social enterprises and better assess the various risks.
At this early stage, it is likely best to regulate the risks to those who can
bear them best and keep the lion’s share of social enterprise investing to
those with sophisticated clients. However, social enterprise is also
showing up in the crowdfunding arena, where investment professionals
may not be consulted at all. Nevertheless, crowdfunding rules have placed
some limits on the amounts that can be invested (and thus lost) by
individuals investing in crowdfunding raises.140
While it is possible that social enterprises, including benefit
corporations, will produce market or above-market returns, there is a
significant amount unknown about these companies as investment
vehicles. In addition, the limited empirical research done on social
enterprises shows that they are mostly very young companies; most social
enterprises also appear to be small, though even less research has been
done on the relative size of social enterprises.141 As social enterprises
some accredited but financially unsophisticated investors may face significant risks); Donald C.
Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Technological Disintermediation” for
Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 22–23 (1998) (noting the
thought that “people who have inherited wealth, or have substantial wealth due to real estate
appreciation, or have high incomes from activities requiring no financial acumen will be less likely to
exercise effective analytical judgment or bargaining power in direct offerings” and suggesting
empirical work to uncover the actual results).
140. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 632 (2015) (stating
that “because promising entrepreneurs can be expected to have alternative avenues for financing, some
commentators predict that those with good prospects will prefer other financing sources (such as angel
investors and VCs), leaving crowdfunding investors with the leftovers”); Ryan Caldbeck,
Crowdfunding Won’t Solve the Venture Capital Series A Crunch, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013), http://
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancaldbeck/2013/01/23/crowdfunding-wont-solve-the-venturecapital-series-a-crunch/#7a61309b33c5 (opining that crowdfunding will appeal to entrepreneurs
turned down by venture capitalists or shut out of venture capital financing). See generally Garry A.
Gabison, Equity Crowdfunding: All Regulated but Not Equal, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 359, 389
(2015) (discussing the limits placed by the JOBS Act on the frequency and amount of investment in
equity crowdfunding); Joan MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (A Security): Funding for-Profit
Social Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 317 (2013) (noting social enterprise interest in the
crowdfunding space); Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Se(c)(3): A Catalyst for Social
Enterprise Crowdfunding, 90 IND. L.J. 1091 (2015) (discussing a mechanism for crowdfunding social
enterprises); Sysy Morales, “Beta Bionics” Artificial Pancreas Company: First Startup to Raise $1
Million
in
Public
Stock
Option,
DIABETES
DAILY
(Aug.
2,
2016),
https://www.diabetesdaily.com/blog/beta-bionics-is-the-first-startup-to-raise-1-million-in-publicstock-option-297881/ [https://perma.cc/HY9G-3LNE] (noting that benefit corporation Beta Bionics
was the first company to raise $1 million under new equity crowdfunding rules).
141. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s
Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 259 (2014) (examining the early Delaware public benefit
corporations and finding that 74.5% of the PBCs in her sample were companies incorporated that year,
and thus the vast majority of early Delaware PBCs were not well-established companies converting to
that form); Frederick H. Alexander et al., M&A Under Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Statute:
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mature and we gather better and more extensive data on these entities, it
may be appropriate to revisit investing in benefit corporations and the
accompanying warnings may not need to be as strong.
CONCLUSION
Companies organized under recently passed social enterprise statutes
are starting to enter the public markets and become an option for
investment professionals. Investment professionals covered by ERISA
should approach social enterprises, such as benefit corporations, with
caution because a main reason behind the passage of the social enterprise
statutes was to allow firms to openly and purposefully sacrifice the firms’
financial interests for the broader social good. While the Department of
Labor’s most recent guidance appears to encourage investments with
collateral, social benefits, ERISA remains clear that the financial interests
of plan participants and beneficiaries cannot be sacrificed. ERISA-covered
investment professionals, however, need not completely abandon social
enterprises, as there may be some firms that use their legal status and the
benefiting of other stakeholders to financial advantage. As such, ERISAcovered investment professionals should carefully monitor the social
enterprise space and thoughtfully analyze individual investments.
Currently, venture capitalists and other investment professionals who are
unburdened by ERISA, and who generally deal with more financially
sophisticated clients, can use contracts to make investments that properly
address the profit and purpose balance desired by their clients.142 If current
trends continue, evaluating social enterprises will play an increasing role
in the lives of investment professionals, requiring close evaluation of the
growing empirical data, in pursuit of the best interests of their clients.

A Hypothetical Tour, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 255, 279 (2014) (describing Delaware public benefit
corporations, at the time of publication, as “closely held by a cohesive group of like-minded
stockholders with similar preferences regarding the balance between pecuniary gain and the
corporation’s stated public purpose”); Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in
Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1016 (2013) (noting that “most benefit corporations are
likely to be closely held”).
142. See Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with FLY Paper: A Hybrid
Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495, 1496–99 (2013) (proposing use of
contractual tools to set terms for investing for both financial and social gain).

